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leniency. But the postal clause can not be invoked as a source of police power
wherever a business makes use of the mails. Universal dependence upon the
postal system cannot be made the basis of such an extension of congressional
power.
SUPERVENING IMPOSsIBILITY oF PERFORMANCE AS A DEFENSE.r-The ever in-
creasing tenseness in international relations, fomented by internal strife, and
aggravated by international animosities, may soon eventuate in armed con-
flict between major powers. One inevitable consequence of any such conflict,
because of the extensiveness of modern commercial intercourse, will be a serious
interference with the performance of executory contracts throughout the world.
Thus the moment is rendered propitious for the examination of an excusatory
mechanism created by the courts, through the use of which promisors are re-
lieved from the obligations of their contracts upon the plea that subsequent
events have rendered performance impossible.
The General Rule
The civil law recognized supervening impossibility of performance as a com-
plete defense to an action on contract, unless it appeared that the promisor had
assumed the risk that performance would remain possible.1 A diametrically
opposed view was adopted by the common law. Thus in Paradine v. Janea
decided in 1647, the court declared, and modern authorities reiterate,0 that
where supervening events render performance impossible, the promisor is not
excused unless the parties have so provided, notwithstanding such events were
beyond his control. The rationale underlying this principle is clear. It is
premised on the position that a contractual obligation is one voluntarily under.
taken; that the parties are free to determine the precise terms, conditions and
limitations of such obligation; that it is within the power of the promisor to
qualify his obligation; that an obligation undertaken without qualification must
be performed or damages given; and that it is the duty of the court to enforce
the contract as made by the parties.4 The principle enunciated in Paradine v.
1. 1 DOMAT, CIvir LAW (1850) 174, art. IX; 3 WLUSTON, CONTRCTS (1920) § 1979.
2. Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Reprints 897 (K. B. 1647). The case is not strictly one of
impossibility. See Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Pcrformance
(1920) 18 MIcH. L. REv. 589, 594.
3. The Harriman, 76 U. S. 161 (1869); see Lavigne v. Lavigne, 176 At. 282, 284
(N. H. 1935); Camelon-Hawn Realty Co. v. City of Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 382, 101
N. E. 162, 163 (1913). See also 7 HAxsauRY's, LAws OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1932) 209;
3 STEPnENs, COmmNTARiES (19th ed. 1928) 176; Woodward, Impossibility of Perlormanca
as an Excuse for Breach of Contract (1901) 1 COL. L. REv. 529.
4. The language of the reporter has become classic: ". . . where the law creates a duty
or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, and hath
no remedy over, there the law will excuse him . . . but when the party by his own
contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, If he may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract." Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng. Reprints 897, 897
(K. B. 1647).
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Jane, logical and easy to apply, recognizes and preserves the integrity of con-
tracts. Its occasional harshness has been subjected to criticism.5 Yet both courts
and commentators have recognized its fundamental soundness,0 and it undoubt-
edly possesses the desirable attributes of simplicity and certainty.7
In the latter half of the nineteenth century a method for the circumvention
of this principle was provided. 8 Thereafter its validity as a general rule was
overshadowed by the creation and growth of an exceptive doctrine, the develop,
ment of which, a process not yet culminated, has resulted in a virtual volte-face
in the law.P Unfortunately the change is neither complete nor free from con.
fusion. But the course of its development along two principal avenues affords
a basis for the investigation of the extent of the advance. It is clear that the
concept of impossibility has been broadened, and that the number of situations
wherein the courts have recognized impossibility as a defense has multiplied.
Thus the inquiry will be: "What is impossibility?" and "When is impossibility
a defense?"
What Is Impossibility?
The term "impossibility" is "unfortunate legal nomenclature."' 0 It is loosely
applied to a variety of situations. For example, assume that A agrees to sell
his boat, "The Jolly Roger," to B and the latter agrees to pay $1000 therefor
on delivery. Performance by A would become impossible if the boat were
destroyed either before or after the contract was made. The former would
be denominated original impossibility; the latter supervening impossibility.
Where original impossibility exists the problem is whether a contract was created.
Ordinarily no contract results either on the ground of failure of consideration,"
or because of mistake.' 2 But a person may bind himself to perform a contract
which is in fact impossible of accomplishment. 3 Where supervening impos-
sibility occurs the problem is not whether a contract was created, but whether
5. Conlen, Intervening Impossibility of Performance as Affecting the Obligations of
Contracts (1918) 66 U. or PA. L. RPv. 28, 29 et seq.
6. See Superintendent, etc. v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513, 519 (1859); Lorillard v. Clyde,
142 N.Y. 456,462,37 N. E. 489,491 (1894); 3 STEHFr-s, Coamt TAnRxs (19th ed. 192S) 177.
7. "In short, the first test of the practicability of a Yule of law is its certainty and
the ease with which it can be stated to parties by counsel, in advising them, in advance
of action, upon the legality of their contemplated acts.' Beale, What Law Goverrs the
Validity of a Contract (1909) 23 H.Anv. L. .rn. 1, 260, 264.
8. Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Reprints 309 (Q. B. 1863). See infra
p. 326 et seq.
9. See Conlen, supra note 5, at 38.
10. See 5 PAGE, CoNRcAS (2d ed. 1921) § 2667.
11. 7 HA-SBuRY'S LAWS or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1932) 208. See RESrATmmr, Cox,.rMcTs
(1932) § 456.
12. 5 PAGE, CoNTRACrs (2d ed. 1921) 4700. Mistake may also be the ground for
excusing supervening impossibility. Richardson Lumber Co. v. HoPy, 219 Midch. 643,
189 N. W: 923 (1922); see 1 Wrmr/sox, S.,rrs (2d ed. 1924) 300 et seq. But see VowD,
SAlEs (1931) 117 n99; (1923) 32 YAix L. J. 408.
13. 3 Ws.LiTO., CoNTRAcrs (1920) 3286, 3287; REsT,*rE!I;T, Co:.TxmcrS (1932) § 456,
Comment c. Of course, a promise to do a thing then forbidden by law does not create
a contract. Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99 (1914).
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the contractual obligation was discharged. Under the general rule the promisor
is not discharged. How far this has been changed by the exceptive doctrine
will be hereafter considered. Again impossibility is characterized as objective-
when due to the nature of the thing to be done, and subjective-when due to
the promisor's incapacity to perform. Thus A's inability to deliver the destroyed
boat would constitute objective impossibility. B's inability to make payment,
assuming tender of the boat were duly made, wQuld constitute subjective
impossibility. Unless fused with objective impossibility, as in the case of
contracts for personal services, subjective impossibility is never a defense.14
Finally, the courts classify as impossible a performance rendered merely illegal,
as well as one rendered actually impossible by acts of paramount authority.
Apart from constitutional questions, a supervening law making the sale of
the boat a crime, would illustrate the former. And requisition of A's vessel
by the government would illustrate the latter.
Confining the inquiry to supervening impossibility, what constitutes such
impossibility? Under a literal interpretation of the term it has been said that
impossibility exists when "the thing cannot by any means be effected."' 5 This
definition is too narrow. The broader definition adopted by the American
Law Institute, 16 including impracticability as well as strict impossibility, is far
more accurate under the decided cases.17 What constitutes impracticability
is a matter of degree. Yet there are certain elements which may give a clue
as to when impracticability approximates impossibility.
Where the specific subject matter of the contract is destroyed, solution is
simple. The same is true in the case of the death, incapacitating illness or
insanity of a person who has contracted to perform personal services.18 But
once past these familiar landmarks the road becomes obscured. The mere fact
that performance has become more difficult does not render it legally impos-
sible.' 9 For example, the breakdown of machinery; 20 the inability to obtain
14. 3 WILmSToN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1932. For a criticism of this position sce,
Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices (1924) 24 Co,.
L. REv. 335, 349.
15. Cameron-Hawn Realty Co. v. City of Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 381, 101 N. E. 162,
163 (1913).
16. RESTAT ENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 454.
17. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 458 (1916); Krell v.
Henry, [1903] 2 K. B. 740; Comment (1899) 12 HA-v. L. REv. 501; (1900) 13 HARV.
L. Rav. 605. See also cases cited notes 50, 89-101, infra.
18. In connection with contracts to marry, illness of the promisor, although serious,
is not treated as impossibility [Shepler v. Chamberlain, 226 Mich. 112, 197 N. W. 372
(1924); Hall v. Wright, E. B. & E. 765, 120 Eng. Reprints 605 (Q. B. 1859)] unless
marriage will hasten death. Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 690, 34 S. E. 621 (1899); (1900)
13 HARv. L. RaV. 605.
19. International Trading & Rice Corp. v. Benscheidt, 141 Kan. 416, 41 P. (2d) 737
(1935); Isaacson v. Starrett, 56 Wash. 18, 104 Pac. 1115 (1909); Anon., Effect of Inter-
vening Impossibility Upon Contract to Repair Another's Building (1929) 14 MiNx. L. Rav. 51.
20. Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487 (1875); Summers v.
Hibbard, 153 fll. 102, 38 N. E. 899 (1894).
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freight cars; 21 the failure of a third person to perform his contract;2- the
levelling of a building by a gale;m a general financial stringency; 2 ' and a
general stagnation of business25 have been held insufficient. Yet as to the effect
of strikes the courts have differed widely. It has been held that a strike is
not sufficient; 26 but a distinction has been made where the strike was accom-
panied by violence.27 Performance that has become more expensive or less
profitable is not generally regarded as an impossibility.P Yet in an extreme
case the court relieved the promisor.29 Where an element of danger has been
injected into the situation the courts have treated further performance as
impossible. Thus an employee is justified in quitting his job when cholera
imperils the vicinage,30 and also when he is threatened with bodily injury by
strikers.31 Moreover, where war is imminent, a vessel need not continue its
voyage to the port of a prospective enemy,32 and after the outbreak of war,
a sailor is justified in leaving a vessel which is to sail through the war zone.P
It is apparent that the courts, influenced by collateral factors imposing hard-
ship on the promisor, have sometimes treated as impossible that which in fact
remained possible of performance. But the effect of collateral factors in par-
ticular cases is conjectural. Furthermore, the extension of the exceptive doc-
trine to the frustration of the object or purpose of the parties or of the
21. Graham v. United States, 231 U. S. 474 (1913); Eppens v. Littlejohn, 164 N. Y.
187, 58 N. E. 19 (1900).
22. Marsh v. Johnston, 125 App. Div. 597, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1106 (2d Dep't 1903),
aff'd, 196 N. Y. 511, 89 N. E. 1104 (1909).
23. Board of Education v. Townsend, 63 Ohio St. 514, 59 N. E. 223 (1905).
24. Ingham Lumber Co. v. Ingetsoll & Co., 93 Ark. 447, 125 S. W. 139 (1910);
Marionneaux v. Smith, 163 So. 206 (La. App. 1935); Locker v. Heikermah, 123 MNsc.
157, 204 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1924). But see Patterson, loc. dt. supra note 14.
25. McCreery v. Green, 38 Alich. 172 (1878); Anspach v. Bast, 52 Pa. 356 (1863).
26. Barry v. United States, 229 U. S. 47 (1913); Black-stock v. The N. Y. & E. R. R.,
20 N. Y. 48 (1859); cf. Barnum v. Williams, 115 App. Div. 694, 102 N. Y. Supp. 874
(2d Dep't 1906), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 537, 83 N. E. 1122 (1907). See Comment (1919) 19
CoL. L. Rav. 224. Contra: The Richlafid Queen, 254 Fed. 663 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), Celt.
denied, 248 U. S. 582 (1918).
27. Geismer v. Lake Shore & Mlich. So. Ry., 102 N. Y. 563, 7 N. E. 823 (1886). Ve
do not appreciate the distinction made in these cases, thinking that the difference between
a peaceable and a violent strike as a defense is one of degree only, a strike with violence
being more likely to be a good defense than a peaceable strike." The Richland Queen,
254 Fed. 668, 670 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). See supra note 26.
28. See Parkinson, Excuse of Performance by Existence of Condition Causing Unforeseen
Expense (1916) 4 C-r2r. L. REv. 407.
29. Aineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 498 (1916).
30. Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Ae. 463 (1857).
31. Fischer v. Walsh, 102 Wis. 172, 78 N. W. 437 (1899).
32. The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 12 (1917). But the charter of a neutral
vessel is not discharged, although submarine warfare imperils its voyage, so long as commerce
is continued despite this hazard. Piaggio v. Somerville, 119 Miss. 6, 80 So. 342 (1919).
33. The Epsom, 227 Fed. 158 (D. Wash. 1915); Liston v. The Steam-chip Carpathian,
[19151 2 K. B. 42.
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commercial adventure has considerably increased the difficulty of determining
when impossibility exists.
34
When Is Impossibility A Defense?
A-Exemptions Based on Implied Condition
In 1863, the famous case of Taylor v. Caldwel135 was decided. The court
professed adherence to the principle that supervening impossibility was not a
defense, but restricted its applicability to contracts "positive and absolute, and
not subject to any condition either express or implied." It then announced
that in contracts the performance of which depended upon the continued exist-
ence of a particular person or thing, a condition is "by law implied," that the
perishing of such person or thing will excuse the promisor. The importance
of this case lies in its novel use of the implied condition as a device for the
circumvention of the general rule. Upon the application and extension of this
device is built the major portion of the exceptive doctrine. It is said that the
implied condition is but a method of injecting equitable principles into the
common law.36 Yet its use is susceptible to criticism on the ground that it
is a fiction applied regardless of the intent of the parties,8 7 and that the courts
are remaking the contract. 38 Its immediate effect has been to promote uncer-
tainty and increase litigation.
The exceptions based upon implied condition may be classified as follows: 81
1. Where the performance of a contract depends upon the future40 or
continued 41 existence of a specific thing, its failure to materialize or its destruc-
tion, without the fault of the promisor, excuses non-performance. 42  But where
the subject matter of the contract is not specific, the promisor is not excused,
although without his fault, the thing with which he intended to fulfill his
obligation, fails to materialize or is destroyed.
43
34. See notes 50, 84-101, infra.
35. 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Reprints 309 (Q. B. 1863).
36. Comment (1901) 15 HARv. L. Rmv. 63; Comment (1926) 12 CoR. L. Q. 72,.76.
37. 3 WmI.IsoN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1937.
38. "The interweaving of 'implied terms' is a mere euphemism for the power which
the courts have usurped of supplementing, adding to and subtracting from the bargain
which the parties have made." Mayers, The Need of Law Reform-The Doctrine of the
Frustration of the Adventure (1918) 38 CAir. L. T. 86, 92. See also, Page, Development
of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance (1920) 18 Mxcn. L. Rav. 589, 598 el seq.
39. It is well to note that in America the doctrine is usually spoken of as impossibility
of performance, while in England it is referred to as the doctrine of frustration. See
LEAKE, CONrTAcrs (8th ed. 1931) 531; SALMOND & WINFMD, CONTRACTS (1927) 290 et seq.
40. C. G. Davis & Co. v. Bishop, 139 Ark. 273, 213 S. W. 744 (1919); Ontario
Deciduous Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Cutting Fruit Packing Co., 134 Cal. 21, 66 Pac. 28
(1901); Squiliante v. California Lands Inc., 42 P. (2d) 81 (Cal. App. 1935); Howell v.
Coupland, L. R. 9 Q. B. 462 (1874).
41. Pinkham v. Libby, 93 Me. 575, 45 AtI. 823 (1900); Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62
(1871); Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Reprints 309 (Q. B. 1863).
42. See RE:STATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 457.
43. Pacific Sheet Metal Works v. California Canneries Co., 164 Fed. 980 (C. C. A.
9th, 1908); Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280, 52 N. W.'530 (1892). But in at least one
[Vol. S
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2. Where death or incapacity of the promisor,44 or of a person whose
services he has undertaken to procure, 45 prevents the performance of a contract
for personal services, the promisor is ordinarily discharged.V 0 But the death
or incapacity of the party for whom the services were to be performed does
not necessarily terminate the contract.47
3. Where under the circumstances it is fair to presume that the parties
contemplate that specific means will be used to effect performance, the failure
of such means, without the fault of the promisor, is an excuse.3 The bounds
of this exception are nebulous. Yet it is clear that failure of the means of
performance which the promisor alone can be said to have contemplated, will
not be a defense.4 9
4. Where the contract is made on the basis that a particular state of things
will exist at the time of performance, the non-existence of such state of things,
without the fault of the promisor, frustrates the object or purpose of the con-
tract, and the promisor is excused5 0 It should be noted that in this class
of exceptions the promisor is excused, although performance of his promise
remains possible.
B-Exceptions Based On Public Policy
The remaining portion of the exceptive doctrine is concerned with situations
case the promisor has been excused although the subject matter was not specific. In re
Badische, [1921] 2 Ch. 331.
44. Smith v. Preston, 170 Ill. 179, 48 N. E. 688 (1897); Manvel v. Phillip-, 162 Mas.
399, 38 N. E. 1117 (1894); Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 47 AU]. 286 (1900).
45. Caden v. Farwell, 98 Mass. 137 (1867); Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40 (1877).
46. Where the promisor has died, in the absence of a contrary intention, his personal
representative is not obligated to perform. Comment (1922) 70 U. or PA. L. RE%,v. 203, 209.
In the following cases the contract was held to survive the death of the promnisor. Mac-
Donald v. O'Shea, 58 Wash. 169, 10 Pac. 436 (1910); Volk v. Stowell, 98 Wis. 385, 74
N. W. 118 (1898).
47. Thus it has been held that the insanity of an employer did not terminate a contract
for personal services, Sands v. Potter, 165 El. 397, 46 N. E. 282 (1896). But New York
has held that such a contract is terminated by the employer's death. Lacy v. Getman,
119 N. Y. 109, 23 N. E. 452 (1890); Matter of Daly, 58 App. Div. 49, 68 N. Y. Supp.
596 (1st Dep't 1901); Arming v. Steinway, 35 Misc. 220, 71 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct.
1901); cf. People v. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 174 (1883) ("death" of corpora-
tion via dissolution discharges liability on pre-existing contract for services of an agent).
48. Hackfeld & Co. v. Castle, 186 Cal. 53, 198 Pac. 1041 (1921); Clarksville Land Co.
v. Harriman, 68 N. H. 374, 44 AUt. 527 (1895); Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28
N. E. 595 (1891); Buffalo & L. Land Co. v. Bellevue L. & I. Co., 165 N. Y. 247, 59
N. E. 5 (1901); Nickoll & Knight v. Ashton, Eldridge & Co., [1900] 2 Q. B. 298. See
also cases cited note 40, supra.
49. Summers v. Hibbard, 153 Il. 102, 38 N. E. 899 (1894); Anderson v. May, 50 Minn.
280, 52 N. W. 530 (1892) ; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99 (1854).
50. Buffalo Union Furnace v. United States Shipping Board, 283 Fed. 673 (W. D.
N.Y. 1922), aff'd, 291 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), appeal dismissed, 268 U. S. 707 (1925);
Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N. Y. Supp.
179 (2d Dep't 1915); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. "Churchills," 90 Misc. 370, 153 N. Y.
Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K. B. 740; cf. Federal Sign System
v. Palmer, 176 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston-ctun-Sizewel
Urban Dist. Council, [1916] 2 K. B. 428. See REsATaITJ"r, Coxzcm s (1932) § 288.
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wherein, after the contract is made, performance is rendered impossible or
illegal by paramount authority. This includes changes in statutes or organic
law, the decrees of courts, and the executive acts of states or their political
subdivisions. In the leading case of Baily v. DeCrespigny,51 decided in 1869,
it was held that the promisor was discharged from his covenant by a subse-
quent act of Parliament which deprived him of his power to perform it. The
court based its decision on the premise that where performance is rendered
impossible by a subsequent event which the parties could not reasonably be
said to have anticipated, the promisor is discharged, although his promise was
unqualified. In cases where the right of the promisor to perform has been
subsequently destroyed by change of law, he has been excused on the ground
that performance would involve the doing of illegal acts.52 But the better
explanation of the rationale underlying this portion of the exceptive doctrine
seems to be that to require the promisor to pay damages where the law itself
has taken from him either the power or the right to perform would contravene
public policy."3
The exception may be simply stated as follows: Where performance of a
contract is prevented by a supervening change of law, the promisor is excused.
It should be noted that under this exception are grouped three distinct classes
of cases. The first involves changes in the lex scripta. Thus where performance
is rendered impossible 4 or illegal" by a subsequent change in domestic statute
or organic law, the promisor is discharged. The second group of cases involves
prevention of performance by the acts of a state. Thus where the interdiction
of the executive branch of the government prevents performance, the promisor
is usually discharged. For example, the arrest and imprisonment of the prin-
cipal preventing his appearance in another court, discharges the sureties on
an appearance bail bond;5 6 compulsory military service discharges the further
performance of a contract for personal services,57 and terminates liability on
an office lease; 58 and the requisition of specific goods is a defense in an action
brought against the seller.59 But a temporary exercise of public authority
suspends, and does not discharge a contract. 0 However, where impossibility
51. L. R. 4 Q. B. 180 (1869).
52. Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1910); Doherty v. Montoo
Eckstein Brewing Co., 198 App. Div. 708, 191 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dep't 1921).
53. See Comment (1905) 19 HAiv. L. REv. 134.
54. Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180 (1869).
55. Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1910); American Mercantile
Exchange v. Blunt, 102 Me. 128, 66 Atl. 212 (1906); Doherty v. Monroe Ecksteln Brew-
ing Co., 198 App. Div. 708, 191 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dep't 1921); Cowley v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998 (1912).
56. State v. Herber, 70 Okla. 153, 173 Pac. 651 (1918).
57. Marshall v. Glanvill, £1917] 2 K. B. 87.
58. State Realty Co. v. Greenfield, 110 Misc. 270, 181 N. Y. Supp. $11 (N. Y. Mun.
Ct. 1920).
59. Shipton, Anderson, & Co. v. Harrison, [1915) 3 K. B. 676.
60. Baylies v. Fettyplace, 7 Mass. 325; see School District v. Howard, 5 Neb. (Unof.)
340, 98 N. W. 666, 667 (1904). So too on the theory that the inhibition is temporary,
an embargo is usually held to suspend a contract. Andrew Millar & Co. v. Taylor & Co.,
[1916] 1 K. B. 402. See also cases cited note 109, infra.
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is caused by the executive acts of a foreign state,0 ' if the contract is neither
made in such state nor governed by its laws, the promisor is not discharged.
The third group of cases involves prevention of performance by decree of
court. In this group the authorities are in conflict. Thus it has been held that
where performance of a contract is forbidden by an injunction obtained by a
third person, the promisor is excused. 2  But there is equally good authority
for the position that such injunction is not a defense. 3 The appointment of
a receiver of the property of the promisor has been held to discharge his
executory contracts." But here too there is equally good, if not better authority
to the contrary.65  Again .as to the effect of corporate dissolution there are
divergent views. Thus upon analogy to the death of natural persons, which
event, in the absence of a statute of administration, terminated all contractual
rights and liabilities, it has been held that the executory contracts of a cor-
poration are discharged by its dissolution.00 But under the view that'corporate
assets are a trust fund for the benefit of creditors, the modem cases hold that
the executory contracts of a corporation are not discharged by its dissolution.0 7
C-Is the Exceptive Doctrine Applicable?
It is clear from the foregoing that the general rule that impossibility is not
a defense has been impaired to such an extent that it can no longer truly be
called a general rule. Yet it survives, in a more or less decrepit condition,
side by side, with the vigorous and ever expanding exceptive doctrine, the co-
existence of such divergent approaches giving convenient latitude to the courts,
but being often productive of immeasurable confusion. s Where impossibility re-
61. Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. Macdonald Co., 114 Fed. 935 (S. D. N. Y. 1902);
Richards & Co. v. Wreschner, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (Sup. Ct. 1915), affd on op*rion below,
174 App. Div. 484, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1129 (Ist Dep't 1916). For a criticism of this rule
see Conlen, suprs note 5, at 38. It has been suggested that impossbility induced by the
executive acts of a foreign state may come within the exception excusing the promisor
when the contemplated means of performance have failed. 2 W z.asrox:, S.=x~s (2d ed.
1924) 1652. In Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 250 N. Y. 69, 164 . E. 745 (1928),
defendant contracted to pay rubles to plaintiff at Petrograd on demand. The Soviet
government confiscated defendant's property in Moscow. It was held that as the United
States had not recognized the Soviet government, the confiscation was not an act of
government, and hence defendant was liable fo# damages for non-performance.
62. Kansas Union Life Ins. Co. v. Burman, 141 Fed. 835 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); De
Forest Radio T. & T. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 238 Fed. 346 (C. C A. 2d, 1916); Burkhardt
v. Georgia School Tp., 9 S. D. 315, 69 N. W. 16 (1896).
63. South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co., 179 Fed. 417 (C. C. A.
6th, 1910); Sample v. Irrigation Co., 129 Cal. 222, 61 Pac. 10S5 (1900); Willinson v.
First Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 72 N. Y. 499 (1878).
64. Moller v. Herring, 255 Fed. 670 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Law v. Waldron, 230 Pa.
458, 79 At. 647 (1911).
65. Curtis v. Walpole Fire & Rubber Co., 227 Fed. 698 (D. Mass. 1915); Wells v.
Hartford Manilla Co., 76 Conn. 27, 55 At. 599 (1903); Commercial Pub. Co. v. Beck-
with, 167 N. Y. 329, 60 N. E. 642 (1901).
66. See 5 PAcm, CoNTRACTS (2d ed. 1921) § 2687.
67. Id. § 2688.
68. In Leiston Gas. Co. v. Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban Dist. Council, [1916] 2 K. B.
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sults from the acts or omissions of the promisor, it is clear that the exceptive doc-
trine is inapplicable."9 Conversely, the rule that a person cannot take advantage
of his own wrong, excuses the promisor where performance is rendered impos-
sible through the fault of the promisee. 7 0  But more frequently neither party
is at fault, and then the question arises whether the general rule or the excep-
tive doctrine is applicable. In Taylor v. Caldwell,71 the applicability of the
general rule was restricted to contracts "positive and absolute and not subject
to any condition either express or implied." But when, in the absence of an
express condition, 72 is a contract "positive and absolute"? The best, and
frequently the only evidence of the nature of the obligation undertaken by the
parties to an express contract, is the language eniployed. Yet a reading of
the cases conclusively shows that this is not a reliable test. In a few cases
the courts have squarely decided that the contract was absolute. 8 But these
decisions offer little aid as a universal solution. In another group of cases
it is said that where the subsequent event which caused the impossibility was
foreseeable at the time the contract was made, and the promisor neglected to
428, 432, Lord Reading, C. J., freely admits that "It is often difficult . . . to determine on
which side of the line the particular case falls". In Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500,
28 N. E. 595 (1891), a manufacturer who had contracted to nftake cheese at his factory
was discharged by its destruction. Yet in a recent case a dealer who contracted to sell
a specified quantity of molasses from a particular refinery was compelled to pay damages,
although a reduction in the output of such refinery made his performance impossible.
Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar, 258 N. Y. 194, 179 N. E. 383 (1932). For
a criticism of this case see (1932) 1 BROOxLYN L. REv. 82.
69. Buchanan v. Louisiana Exposition Co., 245 Mo. 337, 149 S. W. 26 (1912); (1904)
18 HARv. L. Ray. 64.
70. Vandergrift v. Cowles Engineering Co., 161 N. Y. 455, 55 N. E. 941 (1900).
The promisor is excused whether performance is prevented by the promlisee's lack of
cooperation, where required, or by his hindrance. See Comment (1907) 20 -TW. L. REV.
643; Comment (1926) 12 CORN. L. Q. 72,
71. 2 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Reprints 309 (Q. B. 1863).
72. It is customary to insert excusatory clauses in contracts. Generally the courts
have construed such clauses strictly. See 5 PAcE, CoNmAcrs (2d ed. 1921) § 2678; 3
Wr.LisTor, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1968; 2 Wxmr sToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 661-c; Comment
(1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 776.
73. In Hale v. Rawson, 4 C. B. N. S. 84, 140 Eng. Reprints 1013 (1858), defendant
agreed to deliver 50 cases of tallow on the safe arrival of the "Countess of Elgin." The
defendant was held liable although upon arrival of the vessel it was discovered that the
tallow had not been loaded. Williams, J., writes at 95, 140 Eng. Reprints 1017, "But where
the agreement is absolute, or conditioned on an event which happens, the vendor will be
liable for a breach, although he could not help the non-performance; for it is his own
heedlessness, if he runs the risk of undertaking to perform an impossibility, when he might
have provided against it by his own contract." In Ashmore & Son v. Cox & Co., (1899]
1 Q. B. 436, defendants agreed to ship Manila hemp from the Philippines. The Spanish.
American War prevented such shipments. The court held the contract absolute, refusing
to follow Howell v. Coupiand, L. R. 9 Q. B. 462 (1874), upon which defendants Yelled,
This case is criticized in 3 WILLIsToN, CONRACTS (1920) 3312. Where the promisor, but
not the promisee, knows that performance is impossible, his promise is deemed absolute.
Thus in an action for breach of contract to marry, defendant cannot plead his prior
marriage as a defense. Wild v. Harris, 7 C. B. 999, 133 Eng. Reprints 395 (1849).
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qualify his obligation, his promise will be deemed absolute.7 4 Foreseeability,
however, is possible in almost every case.7j 5 The answer seems to be that
whether a particular contract is absolute depends upon all the circumstances
of the case and the attitude of the court.
Various attempts have been made to formulate a basis for the solution of
the problem as to when the exceptive doctrine should be applied.70  The best
suggestion seems to be Professor Woodward's: "If the contingency which makes
the contract impossible of performance is such that the parties to the contract,
had they actually contemplated it, would probably have regarded it as so
obviously terminating the obligation as not to require expression, failure of
performance should be excused." 77
Impossibility Induced by War
A-In General
The outbreak of war has grave repercussions in all nations, whether they
be combatants or non-combatants, because of modem economic interdependence
coupled with extensive commercial intercourse. Thus it is readily compre-
hensible that a conflict of such magnitude as the World War which tremendously
increased the burdens of obligations undertaken while peace prevailed, pre-
74. Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Rowe v. Town of Peabody,
207 Mass. 226, 93 N. E. 604 (1911); City of Minneapolis v. Republic Creosoting Co.,
161 Minn. 178, 201 N. W. 414 (1924); Rane)r v. Goldberg, 244 N. Y. 438, 155 N. E. 733
(1927); see Comment (1922) 8 Coas. L. Q. 62, 64. Where a subsequent change of law
is foreseeable the promisor is not excused. Houston Ice & Brewing Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex.
79, 88 S. W. 197 (1905); (1905) 19 HAv. L. REv. 134.
Climatic conditions are generally regarded as foreseeable, e.g., a drought, although of
unprecedented severity. Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). Con-
sequently interference by a flood is not a defense. Mitchell v. Hancock County, 91 Miss.
414, 45 So. 571 (1908); Pengra v. Wheeler, 24 Ore. 532, 34 Pac. 354 (1893); see United
States v. Lewis, 237 Fed. 80, 81 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). But some courts have excused the
promisor where performance was prevented by unusual climatic conditions. Ontario
Deciduous Fruit Growers As'n v. Cutting Fruit Packing Co., 134 Cal. 21, 66 Pac. 28 (1901)
(drought); Squillante v. California Lands Inc., 42 P. (2d) 81 (Cal. App. 1935) (unusual
heat); Buffalo & L. Land Co. v. Bellevue L. & I. Co., 165 N. Y. 247, 28 N. E. 595 (1901)
(snow and ice); Lovering v. Buck Mountain Coal Co., 54 Pa. 291 (1867) (flood); Howell
v. Coupland, L. R. 9 Q. B. 462 (1874) (blight).
75. See 3 Wirreso. CoTRrAcrs (1920) 3317.
76. See Bafly v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180, 185 (1869); Comment (1922) 8
CoRu. L. Q. 62, 64.
77. Woodward, Impossbility of Performance as an Excuse for Breach of Contract (1901)
1 CoL. L. Ray. 529, 533. This suggestion has been characterized as too narrow. Conlen,
supra note 5, at 32. On the other hand it has been characterized as the "most warrantable
generalization that has yet been made on this question as to when, upon the doctrine of
implied conditions, performance should be excused by impossibility." Woodruff, Book
Review (1927) 12 Com. L. Q. 553, 554. An observation made in reference to conditions
in contracts would seem helpful in this connection: "The court . . . asks what would have
been the intention of the parties if the unprovided for contingency to be met had suggested
itself to their minds and if they had been actuated by just motives." Cosrnwu' Tn Pm-
popasxcn op CoNTRACTS (2d ed. 1927) 9, n 23.
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disposed the courts towards indulgence,7 8 and resulted in further expansions
of the exceptive doctrine.
Such a frequently recurring phenomenon as war soon developed its own
peculiar body of law defining the rights, liabilities and obligations of contractees
resident in opposing belligerent nations. In reference to such contracts the
courts have apparently acted on the theory that warfare is conducted upon
an economic as well as a military plane. Thus the rights of an alien enemy
under a contract fully executed on his part survive,70 but the enforcement of
such right is suspended for the duration of the war.80 Where the contract is
executory, if performance was prevented by domestic war measures, 81 or if
performance would aid the enemy,82 the promisor is discharged. In reference
to executory contracts between parties who are not alien enemies, where per-
formance becomes impossible or illegal, the exceptive doctrine, though somewhat
more relaxed, is appliedP5
B-The Doctrine of the Frustration of the Commercial Adventure
Shortly after the outbreak of the World War, the English courts were brought
face to face with problems resulting from unprecedented conditions which
completely disrupted the commercial affairs of that nation. Under pressure
of such conditions the House of Lords developed the doctrine of the frustration
78. "The war has in a different degree, perhaps, affected the performance of many,
if not the larger part, of outstanding and unexecuted contracts between citizens of the
United States. . . ." Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 253 Fed.
499, 507 (S. D. Ohio 1918). "After all, the class of cases to which this belongs is inci-
dental to the Great War. The world has not seen anything like it for 100 years. Every-
one everywhere is praying and planning that it shall be the last great clash of arms.
Nevertheless it is not uneasonable to hope that a century may pass before we have another.
No great harm may come if we do fail to lay down a general rule for the determination
of controversies which seldom arise, except when a cataclysmic disturbance engulfs the world."
(Italics supplied.) The Isle of Mull, 257 Fed. 798, 809 (D. Md. 1919).
79. E.g., debts owing to alien enemies. Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U. S. 177 (1872); Roth-
barth v. Herzfield, 100 Misc. 470, 166 N. Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
80. Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U. S. 177 (1872); see Janson v. Dreifontein Consolidated Mines,
[1902] A. C. 484, 493. The Statute of Limitations does not run against an alien enemy
while the war lasts. The Protector, 79 U. S. 700 (1871); Brown v. Hiatts, supra. Contra:
Nathan v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 250, 165 N. E. 282 (1929).
81. Hand, The Trading with the Enemy Act (1919) 19 COL. L. REv. 112, 126, 127 n 26,
82. Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 763, 119 Eng. Reprints f430 (Q. B. 1857); Karberg
& Co. v. Blythe, Green Jourdain & Co., [1916] 1 K. B. 495; Zinc Corp., Ltd. v. Hirsch,
[1916] 1 K. B. 541; In re Halsey v. Lovenfield, [1916) 2 K. B. 707, it was held that the
war did not dissolve a theatre lease, although the lessee was an alien enemy. Moreover,
since the alien enemy's Yemedies are suspended during war, it was held that the lessee could
not bring in a party to whom he had assigned the lease.
83. In this connection see 5 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1921) § 2759 et seq.; Blair,
Breach of Contract Due to War (1920) 20 Cor. L. REv. 413; Dodd, Impossibility of Per-
formance of Contract Due to War Time Regulations (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rav. 789; Hall,
The Effect of War on Contracts (1918) 18 CoL. L. REV. 325; Hand, supra note 81; McNair,
War Time Impossibility of Performance of Contract (1919) 35 L. Q. Rav. 84; Comment
(1924) 34 YALE L. J. 91.
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of the commercial adventure.84 This doctrine was not entirely new but resulted
from the synthesis of two distinct lines of cases, the first being Taylor v. Caldwdl
and its extensions, 85 the second involving marine contracts.P3 In this latter
group the cases were not concerned with the question of impossibility. They
raised the question whether a charterer had the right to repudiate a charter
party and refuse to load the chartered vessel after its delayed arrival, the test
being, was the delay of such a nature as to frustrate the original voyage con-
templated by the charterer. Thus the courts arrived at the conclusion that
where a supervening event, beyond the control of either party, rendered further
performance of a contract commercially impracticable, a condition should be
implied that the parties be discharged.8 7 "The underlying ratio [decidendi]
is the failure of something which was at the basis of the contract in the mind
and intention of the contracting parties." ss
This frustration doctrine was developed in a group of cases which came
before the House of Lords shortly after the war began, of which Horlock v.
Beal,89 decided in 1916, was the first. In this case it was held that the
detention of a British vessel at Hamburg following the outbreak of war, frus-
trated the contemplated adventure, and terminated the owners' liability for
wages to the crew. Within a few months thereafter the Tamplin casePO was
decided. The question involved the effect of the requisition of a chartered
vessel at a time when the charter had three more years to run. The court,
influenced by the fact that the charterer was desirous of continuing the contract,
reaffirmed the doctrine, but held it inapplicable. Whatever doubts followed
this decision were dispelled when the doctrine was again applied in the Metro-
politan Water Board case91 wherein it was held that a pre-war contract to
construct a reservoir within six years from August, 1914, was terminated by
a government order to cease work in February, 1916, because conditions had
84. "It is really a device, by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled
with a special exception which justice demands.' Lord Sumner in Hirji Mulji v. Cheong
Yue Steamship Co., [19261 A. C. 497, 510.
85. See p. 326, supra et seq. See the opinion of Lord Shaw in Horlock v. Beal, [1916]
1 A. C. 486, 512, 513, wherein he unifies the two dases of cases. See criticism 9 PAG,
Co x m (2d ed. 1921) 4880.
86. Jackson v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 10 C. P. 125 (1874). See also, Freeman v.
Taylor, 8 Bing. 124, 131 Eng. Reprints 34S (C. P. 1831); McAndrew v. Chapple, I C. P.
643 (1866); Geipel v. Smith, L. R. 7 Q. B. 404 (1872).
87. Horlock v. Beal, [1916] 1 A. C. 486. Earl Loreburn writes, "In my view the
first question to be decided is whether or not . . . the performance of this contract of
service became impossible, which means impracticable in a commercial. s .ense (p. 492).
"I think it was an implied term of this service . . . that it should be pYacticable for
the ship to sail on this voyage, in that sense which disregards minor interruptions and
takes notice only of what substantially ends the possibility of the service contemplated
being fulfilled. Both employer and employed made their bargain on the footing that,
whatever tempo ary interruption might supervene, the ship and crew would be available
to carry out the adventure." (p. 494).
88. Horlock v. Beal, [1916] 1 A. C. 4S6, 512, per Lord Shaw.
89. [19162 1 A. C. 486.
90. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [1916] 2 A. C. 397.
91. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, KeIr & Co., Ltd., [1918] A. C. 119.
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so changed that to hold otherwise would be to impose a new and wholly
different contract upon the parties. Meanwhile the same doctrine was being
developed in the United States. The Kronprinzessin CeCilie, 2 decided by the
Supreme Court, although it does not speak of frustration of the commercial
adventure, can be justified on no other ground. There it was held that the
master of a German vessel en route to Plymouth, was justified in abandoning
his voyage when war seemed imminent, although it appeared that he could
safely have landed the freight and could have departed within a few hours
before the actual declaration of war. Subsequent decisions fully accepted the
language and reasoning of the English precedents.3
The doctrine of the frustration of the commercial adventure is applicable
to all types of commercial contractsY4 But in the course of applying the
doctrine to specific cases the courts have sensed the necessity of limiting its
scope. Thus it has been held that the doctrine is inapplicable where performance
has merely been rendered more difficultI or more costly,6 or temporarily
impossible.97 The doctrine will not be applied where the failure of the adven-
ture is not the result of an unexpected supervening cause,08 and war, of itself,
is not such a supervening cause as will justify its application. 9 Whether or
not a contract has been frustrated is a question of law for the court to decide.100
Ultimately, "the frustration of an adventure depends on the facts of each
case."
101
C-Applications of the Exceptive Doctrine
War may interfere either directly or indirectly with the performance of
pre-existing executory contracts. Indirect interference is usually the result
92. 244 U. S. 12 (1917) (also reported under the name of North German Lloyd v.
Guaranty Trust Co.). See The Poznan, 276 Fed. 418, 425 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), wherein
it is referred to as a frustration case and is coupled with the English precedents. See
Conlen, supra note 5, at 37. "No decision has been found which goes farther in excusing
non-performance occasioned by war. . ." Hall, supra note 83, at 340.
93. Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377 (1919); Texas Co.
v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U. S. 619 (1921); The Isle of Mull, 278 Fed. 131 (C. C. A,
4th, 1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 662 (1922); The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d,
(1920); The Frankmere, 278 Fed. 139 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 662
(1921). See Conlen, The Doctrine of Frustration as Applied to Contracts (1922) 70 U. or
PA. L. Rrv. 87, 93.
94. See Notes (1919) 3 A. L. R. 21; (1920) 9 A. L. R. 1509; (1921) 1 A. L. R. 1512;
(1925) 37 A. L. R. 1499. In Whitehall Court, Ltd. v. Ettlinger, (19201 1 K. B. 680,
the court refused to apply the doctrine to a lease.
95. Blackbuln Bobbin Co., Ltd. v: Allen & Sons, [1918] 2 K. B. 467; see Texas Co. v.
Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U. S. 619, 630 (1921).
96. Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919);
see Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U. S. 619, 630 (1921).
97. Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban Dist. Council, [1916] 2 K. B. 428,
98. The Poznan, 276 Fed. 418 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). See also Brevard Tannin Co. v.
J. F. Mosser Co., 288 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
99. Hulton & Co. v. Chadwick & Taylor, 34 T. L. R. 230 (C. A. 1918), afl'd, 39 T. L. R.
620 (H. L. 1919).
100. Comptoir Commercial Anversois v. Power, Son & Co., [1920] 1 K. B. 868,
101. See Bank Line, Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co., [1919) A. C. 435, 439.
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of the disturbance of the economic balance. As in cases where war is not a
factor, it is generally held that a mere increase in the difficulty 0 2 or cost 0 3
of performance is not a defense. But again the question is one of degree.
Thus in some cases where a shortage of goods or raw materials ensued, and
the promisor was unable to complete his contract, he has been discharged.'"4
So too where performance would entail exposure of person 03 or property 00
to the dangers of war, the promisor has been excused. However, where a
foreign war has prevented performance, the courts have refused to excuse the
promisor. 0
7
In a great number of cases the interference is direct. Thus an embargo may
effect a discharge of the contract' 0 s But it is usually held to be suspensive
only,10 9 and the promisor must wait a reasonable time before he can treat
the contract as terminated.1 0 A contract for the carriage of goods to a specific
port is discharged if such port is blockaded,' unless the blockade is in-
effective." 2 The requisition of a vessel does not terminate the contract of
charter as a matter of law." 3 But if the charter has only a short time to run,
102. Coal Dist. Power Co. v. Katy Coal Co., 141 Ark. 337, 217 S. W. 449 (1920);
Ducas Co. v. Bayer Co., 163 N. Y. Supp. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1916); North Hempstcad v. Public
Serv. Corp., 107 Aisc. 19, 176 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 192 App. Div. 924,
182 N. Y. Supp. 954 (2d Dep't 1920); Blackburn Bobbin Co., Ltd. v. Allen & Son, [1918]
2 K. B. 467.
103. Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919);
Furness, Withy & Co. v. Muller & Co., 232 Fed. 186 (D. Md. 1916); The Themis, 244
Fed. 545 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); City of Moorehead v. Union Lt. Heat & Power Co., 255
Fed. 920 (D. Minn. 1918).
104. Davison Chem. Co. v. Baugh Chem. Co., 133 Md. 203, 104 Ad. 404 (1918);
Tennants Ltd. v. Wilson & Co., [1917] A. C. 495.
105. The Epsom, 227 Fed. 158 (D. Wash. 1915); Liston v. The Steamship Carpathian,
[1915] 2 K. B. 42.
106. The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 12 (1917); cf. Piaggio v. Somerville, 119
i',iiss. 6, 80 So. 342 (1919). See note 32, supra.
107. Standard Silk Dyeing Co. v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chem. Co., 244 Fed. 250
(S. D. N. Y. 1917); Ducas Co. v. Bayer Co., 163 N. Y. Supp. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Richards
& Co. v. Wreschner, 174 App. Div. 484, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Jacobs,
Marcus & Co. v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q. B. D. 589 (1884); Ashmore & Son v. Cox & Co.,
[18993 1 Q. B. 436.
108. Foster v. Compagnie Frantaise, 237 Fed. 858 (E. D. N. Y. 1916).
109. Odlin v. Insurance Co., Fed. Cas. No. 10,433 (C. C. Pa. 1808); Baylies v. Fetty-
place, 7 Mass. 325 (1811); Washington Mfg. Co. v. Midland Lumber Co., 113 Wash. 593,
194 Pac. 777 (1921); Andrew Millar & Co. v. Taylor & Co., [1916] 1 K. B. 402; Jaeger
v. Tolme, etc., [1916] 1 K. B. 939; Smith v. Becker, Grey & Co., [1916] 2 Ch. 86.
110. Andrew Millar & Co. v. Taylor & Co., [1916] 1 K. B. 402. It is pointed out
that this rule is based on hindsight rather than foresight and that it is of little v-alue
as a rule for the governance of future conduct. Blair, supra note 83, at 422.
111. The Spartan, 25 Fed. 44 (S. D. N. Y. 1885). In Eome early cases it was held
that a blockade was merely suspensive. Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johns. 348 (N. Y. 1819);
Ogden v. Barker, 18 Johns. 87 (N. Y. 1820).
112. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Portland & Asiatic S. S. Co., 167 Fed. 1010 (D. Ore.
1909).
113. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [1916] 2 A. C.
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and will probably expire before the war ends, the parties are discharged. 114
So too the requisition of specific goods contracted to be sold excuses the seller. 116
Yet it has been held that the requisition of an apartment for the accommodation
of a governmental bureau, did not relieve the tenant from his covenant to
pay rent.116 Frequently the government finds it expedient to prohibit the
performance of certain contracts for the purpose of conserving war materials.
Where performance is prevented by such order the promisor is discharged, 111
but if only a part of the contract was affected by such order, and it can bo
partly performed, the contract is not terminated 118 Again the government
may find it necessary to provide that its orders for war materials shall be
filled in preference to all other orders. In such a case if the promisor's plant
is unable to fulfill prior contracts due to such preference, he is discharged; 110
even if he voluntarily solicits such preferential orders.1 20  The curtailment of
the personal freedom of one of the parties may terminate the contract.12 1 Thus
the detention of their employees by the enemy has been held to relieve the
employer from liability for wages. 2
2
Conclusion
The value of the exceptive doctrine is controversial. On the one hand it
has gained approbation as a natural and salutary growth of the law. 128 On
the other hand it has been strongly condemned as a deleterious and corrosive
attack upon the very concept of contract.1 24 Its proponents laud its equitable
qualities,125 apparently overlooking the plight of the party injured by non-
397; Modern Transport Co. v. Duneric Steamship Co., [1917) 1 K. B. 370; Chinese Mining
& Engineering Co. v. Sale & Co., [19173 2 K. B. 599; cf. The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276
(C. C. A. 2d, 1920); Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co., [19193 A. C. 435. In
Graves v. Miami Steamship Co., 29 Misc. 645, 61 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1899), the
owner voluntarily Yelinquished the vessel to the government for war use. It was held
that this was not a defense to an action on a pre-existing contract for the carriage of freight.
114. Anglo-Northern Trading Co. v. Emlyn, [1917] 2 K. B. 78 (4 months to expira-
tion); Countess of Warwick Steamship Co. v. Le Nichel Soci6t6 Anonyme, [19181 1 K. B.
372 (5 months to expiration).
115. Shipton, Anderson Co. v. Harrison, [1915) 3 K. B. 676.
116. Whitehall Court Ltd. v. Ettlinger, [1920] 1 K. B. 680.
117. Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. Ltd., [19181 A. C. 119.
118. Federal Sign System v. Palmer, 176 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Lelston
Gas. Co. v. Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban Dist. Council, [1916] 2 K. B. 428. But compare
cases cited note 50, supra.
119. Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore & Tierney, Inc., 265 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920);
Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, 231 N. Y. 290, 132 N. E. 93 (1921), explained in s. c.,
234 N. Y. 244, 137 N. E. 318 (1922).
120. Ibid.; cf. Graves v. Miami Steamship Co., 29 Misc. 645, 61 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Sup.
Ct. 1899), cited note 113, supra.
121. State Realty Co. v. Greenfield, 110 Misc. 270, 181 N. Y. Supp. 511 (N. Y. Mun.
Ct. 1920); Marshall v. Glanvill, [19171 2 K. B. 87.
122. Ho'lock v. Beal, [19161 1 A. C. 486.
123. See Conlen, loc. cit. supra note 5; McNair, loc. cit. supra note 83.
124. Mayers, supra note 38. See also 5 PAoE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1921) 4881; Comment
(1924) 34 YALE L. J. 91.
125. Conlen, supra note 125, at 28.
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performance. Some courts have sensed this defect, and have not hesitated
to warn against further encroachment upon the concept of contractual obliga-
tion.126 On the other hand were the law crystallized in its present state, the
result would be highly unsatisfactory. The coexistence of two basically opposed
principles, the one demanding unswerving adherence to obligations voluntarily
undertaken, the other seeking to alleviate from the burdens of unforeseen
consequences despite the terms of the contract, either of which the courts may
very easily follow in a particular case, destroys certainty and tends to increase
litigation. Perhaps the courts have gone too far to retreat. It would seem
preferable to go the whole way and adopt outright the single principle that
impossibility of performance is always a defense, unless the promisor has
expressly undertaken to perform at all events.
126. See Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co., [1919] A. C. 435, 459; Blackburn
Bobbin Co. v. Alen & Sons, [19181 1 K. B. 540, 550, 552, aF'd [1918] 2 K. B. 467.
